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STANCES
Anthony V Alfierit
I promised to show you a map you say but this is a mural
then yes let it be these are small distinctions
where do we see it from is the question
Adrienne Rich**
INTRODUCTION

The literature of lawyering is far reaching, encompassing doctrine, ethics, institutions, and advocacy. In recent years, scholars intent on bridging the divide between theory and practice have
enriched this literature by drawing on interdisciplinary work in anthropology, linguistics, and sociology. This integration has opened
up new visions of lawyer/client discourse, interpretation, and practice. The visions reflect the postmodern turn to contest, contingency, exclusion, hierarchy, multiplicity, partiality, and plasticity.'
This turn has begun to reveal a sociolegal world of lawyer/client
discourse-voices, narratives, stories-that is contested. In this
world, lawyer knowledge is partial; lawyer interpretation is contingent upon multiple categories of age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexual orientation; and lawyer/client relations are
configured by a dominant-subordinate hierarchy of exclusion. Accordingly, the practices of lawyering-interviewing, counseling, negotiation, litigation-appear not as the neutral conventions of a
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; A.B., Brown University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1984.
I am grateful to Naomi Cahn, Mary Coombs, Clark Cunningham, Richard Delgado,
Marc Fajer, Michael Fischl, Ellen Barker Grant, Lili Levi, Peter Margulies, Austin Sarat,
Stephen Schnably, Jean Stefancic, James Boyd White, and Steven Winter for helpfully
commenting upon earlier drafts of this essay. I also wish to thank David Bodian,
Porsche Shantz, Kathleen Young, and the University of Miami School of Law library staff
for their research assistance. My analysis, however unfinished, of modern/postmodern
lawyering has benefited greatly from ongoing conversations with Marie Ashe, Naomi
Cahn, Clark Cunningham, Steven Winter, and Lucie White. They are surely not responsible for my misjudgments.
**
Adrienne Rich, Here is a map of our country, in AN ATLAS OF THE DIFFICULT WORLD:
POEMS 1988-1991 at 6 (1991).
I For lucid explications of postmodernism, see Marie Ashe, Inventing Choreographies:
Feminism and Deconstruction, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1123 (1990); Drucilla Cornell, Toward A
Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985); Pierre Schlag,
"Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi"--The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990); Steven Winter, Painless Postmodernism (Dec. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
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skilled craft, but rather as unstable interpersonal and institutional
contexts for the play of lawyer power and client resistance.
This postmodern analysis has begun to erode the modernist
foundations of lawyering. 2 These foundations embody commitments to express historical forms of lawyer/client discourse, interpretation, and practice. The forms construct a modernist aesthetic
marked by a devotion to craft, reason, understanding, and text.
Carried on by tradition, craft invests normative value in the professional skills and attitudes of lawyering. Reason includes logic and
pragmatism in that value system. Understanding adds the norms of
empathy and self-reflection.
The good modernist lawyer employs skilled craftsmanship,
pragmatic reasoning, and empathic understanding to engage the
multiple texts-client, doctrinal, institutional-of the sociolegal
world. The activity of engaging those texts in advocacy involves a
process of translation. Because that process is distorting, certain
textual meanings will be lost. This loss is the tragedy of modernist
lawyering. It is a tragedy, however, experienced as imperfection,
rather than as the negation of meaning.
The modernist version of tragedy-as-imperfection is crucial to
discerning why the aesthetic canons of modernist lawyering are no
longer adequate to describe or explain the sociolegal world. Under
postmodern scrutiny, the content of lawyer knowledge is incoherent
and unverifiable. The composition of lawyer discourse is suppressive. The organization of legal practice is disempowering. Nevertheless, the foundations of modernist lawyering remain substantially
intact. Whatever movement is detectable grows in part from the
challenge mounted by the scholars gathered here.
In this Essay, I present a rough outline of this emerging challenge. To illuminate its main themes, I survey the different stances
posed by the instant collection of works. Under the thematic of
"modernist" stances, I examine approaches to lawyering that struggle with the epistemic difficulty of deciphering and translating client
stories into paternalistic and disciplinary legal discourses which
distort the meaning of such stories. Under the thematic
"postmodernist" stances, I explore approaches to lawyering that
recognize this difficulty as a given, yet strive to find room to liberate
the client-subject and to permit lawyer/client intersubjectivity in order to reconstruct dominant legal discourses.
2

For an incisive analysis of the evolution of the modernist postition, see Pierre

Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1209-20 (1989).
See also Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/FeminismlLaw, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 262-79

(1992).
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At the outset, I confess that I may have erred towards the overbroad and unambiguous in distinguishing these thematic stances.
Like all dichotomies, the modern/postmodern dichotomy may overextend and underappreciate the insights of an inchoate and perhaps
irresolvable body of scholarship. At best, the thematics may prove
to be a useful heuristic device to guide future inquiry. For this initial inquiry, the Essay is divided into two parts. In Part I, I address
the modernist stances garnered from the writings of Clark Cunningham,3 James Boyd White, 4 and Naomi Cahn. 5 In Part II, I consider
the postmodernist stances gleaned from the writings of William Felstiner and Austin Sarat, 6 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, 7 and
8
Lucie White.
I
MODERN STANCES

The works of Clark Cunningham, James Boyd White, and
Naomi Cahn elegantly express a modernist faith and doubt in lawyering. Together, they share three articles of that faith: translation,
tragedy, and empathy. Through lawyer empathy, each seeks to
enter and to translate the sociolegal worlds of clients while diminishing the tragedy and, at times, the folly of their efforts.
A. Translation
Clark Cunningham explicitly adopts the stance of storyteller to
disclose the linguistic and institutional forces of subordination permeating the process of legal representation. 9 To frame his story, he
proposes the metaphor of the "lawyer as translator," invoking an
image of" 'speaking for another' that is not inherently silencing of
that other."' 0 By means of this metaphor, Cunningham straddles
the modern/postmodern dilemma-simultaneously asserting the efficacy of translation and the false necessity of silencing. For Cunningham, a translator consenually amplifies and alters the voice of
3
Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards an
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992).
4 James B. White, Translationas a Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1388 (1992).
5 Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standardin
Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992).
6
William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992).
7
Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992).
8
Lucie E. White, Seeking "... the Faces of Otherness... " A Response to ProfessorsSarat,
Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499 (1992).
9 Cunningham, supra note 3, at 1299-1300.
10 Id. at 2 (quote is in an original draft, on file with author) (emphasis added).
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the other, thereby transforming her meaning." The postmodern
quandary is whether silencing must be an inherent aspect of that
transformation.
Cunningham offers the metaphor of lawyering as translation to
demonstrate "that one can understand at least some of the silencing
of the client's voice as the lawyer's failure to recognize and implement the art and ethic of the good translator . .12
By his definition, the good translator is one "who shows conscious awareness of
shifts in meaning and who collaborates with the speaker in managing these changes."' 3 Borrowing from the discursive methods of
legal ethnography, Cunningham argues that translation "can be an
effective way of recognizing the difference of 'the other' and expanding imagination sufficiently to have some understanding of the
other's story."' 4 Collaboratively executed, therefore, translation
may alleviate much of the client silencing produced by lawyer discourse. Full understanding of the client-other apparently is unnecessary to accomplish that reduction.
To test this thesis, Cunningham recounts a story of a mishandled translation centering on his representation of M. Dujon Johnson, a black graduate student arrested by state police and charged
with disorderly conduct. The miscarried translation began with
Cunningham's first reading of the police report. From this reading,
Cunningham initially concluded that police troopers unlawfully
stopped and searched Johnson, and then converted the illegal stop
into a pretextual disorderly conduct arrest when Johnson protested
their misconduct. 15 Building his case theory on this conclusion,
Cunningham pursued a Fourth Amendment defense strategy. Accordingly, he filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of Johnson's alleged disorderly conduct. 16 To Cunningham's surprise, the
county judge denied the motion and declared the incident an "attitude arrest."' 17 Cunningham recalls: the "opinion jolted me out of
thinking about what happened only in Fourth Amendment terms."18
Although dismayed by the denial of his motion, Cunningham
explains that the judge's characterization of the arrest suggested an
alternative reading of Johnson's narrative that had been silenced by
Cunningham's own Fourth Amendment strategy. On this reading,
the arrest symbolized "an escalating clash of conflicting attitudes:
"

''

Id. at 1300.

12

13

Id. at 1301.
Id.

14

Id. at

15

Id. at 1303-10.

16

Id. at 1311-13.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1322.

17

18
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Johnson's demand for respect and [the police trooper]'s show of
authority."19
The revision ofJohnson's case to portray the struggle of a black
man to preserve his individual dignity and identity in the face of
state violence disrupted Cunningham's representation. Recognizing his misreading, Cunningham moved to refashion the process of
representation itself. For the modernist lawyer, the discovery of a
narrative misreading requires a new strategic intervention, such as a
new case theory. For the postmodernist, the same discovery evinces
absence and negation, and thus provides the occasion for a new vision of the lawyer/client relation to enable increased collaboration
in constructing the discursive meanings of representation. Cunningham opted for both. He sought to redescribe the arrest incident and to reformulate Johnson's claim for relief. Furthermore,
spurred by Johnson's refusal to plea bargain and his demands for
the restoration of his dignity and the vindication of his rights, Cunningham proposed that Johnson himself cross-examine the arrest20
ing trooper at trial.
Cunningham conceived of the cross-examination not only as a
means to satisfy Johnson's dignity interest and meet his demand for
procedural justice, but also as a "bridging experience" to communicate Johnson's experience of indignity to the jury and ensure the
convergence of procedural justice and substantive relief. 21 Cunningham presumed that this dual translation would decrease the
likelihood that Johnson would be again silenced. Cunningham
notes: "[b]y thinking of the cross-examination, rather than the verdict, as the relief, .

. .

we could make available a legally enabled ex-

perience that shared structural and substantive elements with the
experience of harm." 22 But, before Cunningham implemented his
trial strategy of translation, the county prosecutor dismissed the
complaint against Johnson. In granting the dismissal, the judge
reiterated:
"I think this was an attitude ticket. We see a lot of attitude tickets
23
and um, no question about it."

To Cunningham's surprise, 24 Johnson reacted with outrage, castigating the outcome as "patronizing, patronizing!" 25

23

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326-28.
Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1328.
Id.at 1329.

24

Id.

25

Id.

19
20
21
22
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Later, Cunningham explored the trial outcome with Johnson.
In doing so, he learned that Johnson experienced disempowerment
during the very process of representation that Cunningham conceived and directed purportedly in Johnson's best interest. For the
modernist lawyer, empowerment resembles a weak version of autonomy defined by client decisionmaking. The client is empowered if
she makes an informed and voluntary decision regarding a lawyergenerated option. For the postmodernist, empowerment approximates a strong version of autonomy denoted by the emancipation of
the client-subject. The client-subject is emancipated when her covert resistance grows into overt political intervention. 26 Confronting
Cunningham with this latter version, Johnson declares:
"You're the kind of person who usually does the most harm. You
have a guardian mentality, assume that you know the answer. You
presume you know the needs and the answers. Oversensitivity.
Patronizing. All the power is vested in you. I think you may go
'27
too far, assuming that you would know the answer."
To understand Johnson's reaction to the process and outcome
of representation, Cunningham revisits the metaphor of translation.
His starting point is the centrality of language "in the constitution
of knowledge ....-28 Language, Cunningham contends, "can dramatically affect a person's understanding of experience." 29 The task
of the translator is to "continually confront the flaws of the expression he is creating in the second language, return to the 'other' in
30
the first language, and then begin the endeavor anew."
Cunningham embraces this task by retelling the story of the
Johnson representation. He experiences the task of translation as a
cycle "of creating meaning only to discover its limits, returning
anew to discover what aspects of the client's experience were excluded, trying again, failing again, yet trying once more."'s For
Cunningham, the tragic quality of this cycle of endless and unfinished translation is offset by the "promise" of dislodging the elements of domination plaguing even client-centered acts of
representation.3 2 Here again, Cunningham displays his modernist
faith that the lawyer/client relation may be purged of the contaminations of power. For the postmodernist, the corruptions of hierarchial power cannot be ousted from the lawyer/client relation.
26

See Kelly Oliver, FractalPolitics: How to Use "the Subject", 11 PRAXIS INT'L 178, 190-

92 (1991).
27
Cunningham, supra note 3, at 1330 (footnote omitted).
28 Id. at 1331.
29 Id. at 1338.
30
Id.
31 Id. at 1339.
32
Id. at 1348.
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They are a constitutive part of that relation-open to resistance, but
not disinterment.
Cunningham demonstrates his modernist faith by construing
client narrative as a world text imbued "with inherent, autonomous
meaning" to be transcribed, observed, and examined. 33 He claims
that such a construction of the client's social reality supplies thick
description to the process of representation. At the same time, he
comments that obtaining and communicating that description may
"interfere" with "effective" representation. 34 The client may hesitate to furnish a full textual description. Further, temporal and strategic considerations may militate against its acquisition.
Had Cunningham prevailed at the Johnson suppression hearing, his original translation/silencing strategy might prove defensible on instrumental grounds. Cunningham makes no mention of
any such necessitarian rationale. Instead, he discusses the logic of
the suppression motion as a vehicle to shift the locus of the trial
from substantive criminal law to the broader protections of the
Fourth Amendment; and moreover, the shock of witnessing the
judge's disfigurement of constitutional principles to safeguard the
illegitimate police exercise of state authority.3 5 As a result, it is unclear whether Cunningham sanctions translation/silencing strategies when they work, that is when the client wins. Similarly, it is
unclear to what extent and under what conditions Cunningham values client collaboration in translation or whether he prefers a more
narrow range of participation in, for example, circumstances where
the client's material interests warrant greater lawyer intervention.
Based upon Cunningham's own description of how he planned the
cross-examination strategy for trial, it appears that Johnson's primary role was to acquiesce in Cunningham's decisions. 36 In this
sense, Cunningham reenacted the ritual of authority and submission
imposed by the police, prosecutor, and judge.
Cunningham devotes scant discussion to this subject. We learn
that Johnson yearned for respect and that the police and judge accorded him none. 3 7 But we do not learn why Cunningham was so
inattentive to this concern in the course of representation. Hence,
we are left to wonder whether-in the same way that a "lack of re-

33

Id at 1349.

34 Id. at 1362.
35 Id. at 1363-66.
36 Id. at 1326 n.48. Cunningham states: "I was the first to raise the idea [of crossexamination], but Johnson immediately responded that he had been thinking about asking us if he could participate in cross-examining [the arresting trooper]." Id.
37 Id. at 1366-68.
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spect" was a crucial part ofJohnson's "story of racial oppression"8
a lack of respect may be a constitutive part of translation.3
If the act of marginalizing difference in translation does not imply a lack of respect, then how do we understand Cunningham's
treatment of race in theJohnson case? With great insight, Cunningham writes:
I had from the outset a common-sense impression that what happened that night was a "racial incident," but as a lawyer I did not
talk about "the case" that way, and therefore I ceased to think in
terms of racial issues as our various translations shaped and limited our shifting understanding of what was legally relevant. 3 9
Here, Cunningham's description of the Johnson case suggests
that certain properties of the social world-class and race for example-are not easily translated into lawyer discourse. The act of
translation in fact may exclude or trivialize such differences. Even if
translation respects difference, there is no guarantee that the institutions of the juridical state will grant like recognition. 40 Cunningham
acknowledges this danger, noting that "[t]he final, authoritative description of 'what happened' was spoken in chorus by the prosecutor and judge: 'this is a $50 attitude ticket.' "41
Cunningham attributes to language the cause of his inadvertent
eradication of Johnson's racial identity during his original act of
translation: "While one is speaking a language, its limitations seem
so natural that they are invisible." 4 2 Although this attribution may
be correct, Cunningham ignores the fact that discourse is intimately
bound up in the negations of interpretive violence: marginalization,
subordination, and discipline. 43 These interpretive practices govern
the rules of legal discourse. Moreover, Cunningham overlooks the
tie connecting interpretive and material violence. 44 Indeed, he
never speaks of violence-the violence of language, of translation,

Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1370-71.
In this respect, Johnson comments: "The judge wasn't interested in a translation
of what I had to say; he was interested simply in justifying the actions of the troopers.
You are assuming that the judge-the system-was interested in a translation." Id. at
n.250.
41
Id. at 1372.
42 Id. at 1377.
43 For a discussion of interpretive violence, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2125-30
(1991).
44 On the interpenetration of interpretive and material forms of violence, see Lucie
White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1992).
38
39
40
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of representation, or of state agents. In the modernist lawyer canon, who would have believed him anyway? 45
B. Tragedy
James Boyd White turns the modernist stance into an admission
of tragedy. Evaluating representation as a form of translation 4 6 and
a method of creating meaning, he urges lawyers to honor rather
than appropriate legal texts: "we must make [their] terms our own,
and give them meanings of our own making."'4 7 This arguably is
proper when the text is composed of constitutional, statutory or
common law rules, but what of the living texts of lawyer practice? Is
it possible to honor the living text of the client-other? Is it possible
to honor a client's story while displacing its narrative terms and
meanings?
White suggests that lawyers consider different ways of telling
stories, using different languages and voices, in the hope of arriving
at a shared point of view. He cautions, however, that the language
of the law renders unmediated voices improbable. 48 Rather than be
diverted by this condition, White prods us to assess the merits and
values of legal discourse, notwithstanding its imperfections. Of critical importance for him is the enabling and inhibiting power of legal
language, even if the adopted version of that language omits portions of the social world or of an individual identity. 49
To White, the effacement of reality and identity is a tragedy that
accompanies the translation of conventional language into legal discourse. Although that erasure reflects the exertion of power, it is an
assertion wielded on behalf of the powerless. Thus, White admonishes lawyers to heed the violence of legal discourse, but not to be
dissuaded from its exercise. This is the tragic imperfection of the
modernist stance: the accommodation to violence. That accommodation cannot be saved by White's appeal to the lawyer craftsman's
application of professional skill and moral attitude.50
45
In his correspondence with Cunningham, Johnson writes: "I did not tell you it
was a racial issue, although I knew from the very beginning that it was (my arrest) racially motivated. I would have confided this, but who would have believed me anyway?"
Cunningham, supra note 3, at 1385 (emphasis added).
46
For an alternative exposition of translation, see JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS
TRANSLATION 254-58 (1990) (defining translation as the "composition of a particular
text by one individual mind in response to another text" in a manner that honors the
difference of the other and asserts the autonomy of the self).
47 White, supra note 4, at 1390.
48 Id. at 1391-93.
49 Id. at 1394-95.
50 Id. at 1395.
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Empathy

Feminist stances purport to challenge the theory/practice dichotomy underlying conventional lawyering. 5' Yet, Naomi Cahn
52
observes that feminist stances are often "divorced" from practice.
Cahn attributes this decoupling to a practical failure to translate theoretical insights into "substantive and methodological ways of helping women."5 3 Her objective is to facilitate that translation, to
return theory to practice. 5 4 She writes that "[a]s theory remains
grounded in practice and ethnographic, localized study, not only of
courts, but also of what happens in the attorney-client relationship . . . . 55
For Cahn, theory and practice are intertwined. To illustrate
this thesis, Cahn tells "a story of representation." 5 6 The story describes representation as a complex process of constructing and valuing multiple legal narratives. 5 7 Cahn focuses on several aspects of
that process, including: "1) the client's representations to herself
concerning the nature of her problem and her use of the legal system; 2) the client's representations to her lawyer; 3) the lawyer's
representation of the client to the world outside of the attorneyclient relationship .. .
To explicate the multiple dimensions of representation, Cahn
employs the methodology of the theoretics of practice movement. 59
Thus, she examines the intersection of theory and practice in specific lawyer/client situations, here involving sexual violence against
women. 60 Her text is the language of the reasonable man encoded
61
in the law of sexual harassment, battered women, and rape.
Cahn contends that the reasonable man standard excludes consideration of women as reasonable actors. She demonstrates how
51

See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, The Theory-Practice Spiral. Insights from Feminism and

Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991); Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of
Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
52
Cahn, supra note 5, at I (in original draft, on file with author).
53 Id. at 1 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
54 Cahn admits to reservations "about whether the legal process can meaningfully
address women's needs." Id. at 1398.
55

Id. at 1446.

61

Id.

56 Id. at 1429 n.138.
57 Id. at 1438 n.181.
58 Id. at 1439 n.186.
59 See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 43; Clark Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking
About Law as Language, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Gerald Lopez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice:Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEo. LJ. 1603 (1989);
Lucie White, Subordination, RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof
Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of
Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
60 Cahn, supra note 5, at 1400.
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the standard operates to subordinate and engender violence against
women. 6 2 To halt such physical and interpretive violence, Cahn
proposes reforming conventional theories and methods of representation. She offers the reasonable woman standard as creating
6
the possibility of change.
Cahn argues that the reasonable woman standard embodies women's perceptions of sexual harassment, domestic violence, and
rape. The standard thus serves to foster women's credibility and to
preserve women's stories.64 Despite its effectiveness in communicating and validating the experiences of difference, Cahn also finds
that the reasonable woman standard essentializes and marginalizes
women by exploiting stereotypes of virtue and passivity. 65

She

notes that both the positive and negative attributes contained in
such stereotypes may prove useful in uncovering conditions of dis66
empowerment and strategies of resistance.
Cahn's transformative strategy is designed to reclaim and reconstitute the power embedded in women's stereotypes through
application of the reasonable woman standard. 6 7 As she acknowledges, this strategy is complicated by the diversity of client "backgrounds and motivations" and by the difficulty of translating client
"experiences into legally cognizable claims or defenses." 68 The acknowledged multiplicity of women's experiences distorts the representation process insofar as feminist lawyers "must try to fit [the]
client ('the victim') into an acceptable story so that she can win." 69
In this way, stereotypes necessarily infect the application of the reasonable women standard.
Cahn defends her strategy on instrumental grounds. The reasonable woman standard makes feminist representation "easier"
and mitigates institutional distrust of women's stories. 70 The strategy, however, may actually harm clients. Cahn recognizes "the potentially damaging effects of stereotyping within the attorney-client
relationship. " 7 1 Nonetheless, she seems willing to permit the feminist lawyer to "choose to portray her client in a certain way so that she
'72
will win."
62

Id. at 1404.

63

64
65
66

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

67

Id. at 1418-19.

68

Id. at 1420.

69

Id. at 1421.

70

Id. at 1422.

71

Id.

72

Id. (emphasis added).

1400, 1444.
1409-10.
1415-17.
1417-18 n.104.
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Vesting the power to name 73 women in lawyer discourse reproduces the essentialization and marginalization that Cahn protests.
Cahn points out these results, observing that women's stories which
74
do not fit neatly within conventional discourse will be excluded.
Women, she laments, "must still accommodate their experience to
75
someone else's reasonableness standard."
Paradoxically, Cahn both challenges and ratifies instrumental
accommodation in representation. This is the paradox of modem
practice and postmodern theory. The study culled from her domestic violence practice, the case of Arlene Sims, reveals this opposition
and the ensuing tension of irreconciliation. Cahn introduces Arlene
Sims as a victim of spouse-inflicted domestic violence struggling to
76
enforce a court issued order of protection against her husband.
Investigating the case to establish evidence for a contempt proceeding, Cahn highlights two incidents of abuse in violation of the
court's order of protection. In the first incident, Sims's husband
beat her with a chair. 77 In the second incident, Sims stabbed her
78
husband with a knife to fend off another attack.
Cahn is troubled by this second incident, especially by the "inconsistencies" in Sims's story. 79 To comprehend the incidents,
Cahn develops alternative case theories based on "reasonable
woman" and "victim" stories. In the reasonable woman story,8 0
Sims is "confused about when exactly she had stabbed [her husband] with the knife." 8 ' In the victim story, Sims is "stuck in an
abusive situation ...
2

unable to step out of a cycle of violence with

8
her husband."
Cahn asserts that both theories and stories are true.8 3 Because
of the relative truth content of each version, Cahn adopts an instrumental calculus to determine her strategy of representation at the
contempt proceeding. On this calculus, the question becomes
"whether [Sims] would have a better chance at winning a contempt
proceeding if she appeared to be a victim or a reasonable
73
By naming, I mean the act of describing and classifying women in terms of certain essentialist characteristics. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 177
(1988) (showing "how fundamental assumptions of feminist theory help to disguise the
conflation of the situation of one group of women with the situation of all women.").
74 Cahn, supra note 5, at 1422-23.
75
Id. at 1423.
76
Id. at 1424-30.
77 Id. at 1424.
78
Id. at 1426-27.
79 Id. at 1427.

80

Id.

81
82
83

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1428.
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woman." 8 4 Cahn selects "the reasonable woman approach because
it allowed Ms. Sims some dignity in telling her story to the judge
85
and in front of her husband.
Significantly, on the date of trial, Sims declined to proceed,
withdrawing the complaint against her husband.8 6 Although denied
the opportunity to test her strategy in practice, Cahn concludes that
"[ilt did work to make Ms. Sims feel that she could tell her story in
court." 8 7 According to Cahn, a reasonable woman standard enables
clients to "feel more 'fluent' within the legal system ...."88 Cahn,
however, presents little support for these conclusions. Without
backing, they seem more ideological than real.
Cahn's unwillingness to bolster her conclusions may be traced
to her own postmodern doubt. Cahn concedes that doubt, remarking: "[e]ven to me, [Sims's] behavior initially seemed somewhat risky, not quite reasonable. '8 9 Cahn admits that her image of a
reasonable woman is informed by her own experiences. Unlike
Sims, she is "not a black mother of three who receives AFDC and
has been battered by [her] husband." 90 To empathize with Sims's
situation, Cahn seeks "to know as many facts about her life as possible...... ,"91 Here, Cahn confronts the postmodern recognition of
the partiality of knowledge. This inevitable partiality weakens her
conclusions and limits her plea of thick description on behalf of
Sims. Even if that plea could be fully mustered, it is unlikely to obtain a fair hearing in a legal process where the partiality of class,
92
gender, and race are constant.
This institutional partiality accounts for Cahn's contradictory
stance of embracing a standard of reasonable conduct that simultaneously affirms and denigrates women's lives. 93 The contradiction
is unsurprising; as Cahn mentions, "[t]he reasonable woman standard developed from the experiences of outsiders. ' 94 Differences
of class, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexual orientation characterize
those experiences. 95 Although the reasonable woman standard potentially includes a multiplicity of women's experiences, the legal
84

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
Id. at 30 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
Id. at 1435.
Id. at 1429.

90
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Id.
Id.
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Id. at 1430.
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Id. at 1432.
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Id. at 1435.
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process and, by extension, the act of representation, systematically
96
exclude them.
This is the source of Cahn's modern/postmodern tension. As
she calls for a "return to the excitement of learning from our clients'
experiences in order to craft more effective and responsive legal
theories," modernism claims the prerogative to reshape those clients' stories. 9 7 As she demands that feminist lawyers give clients
"space to speak their own words," modernism cabins that space. 98
As she instructs lawyers to "draw... strength from communities of
disempowered people," 9 9 modernism consolidates lawyers'
power.10 0
Cahn realizes that these tensions are not of her own making but
are inherent in the process of representation. She traces them to
the competing imperatives of "construct[ing] a narrative that tells
the client's story as she would like it to be told"1 0 1 and implementing "concrete strategies that show the inadequacy of existing standards."' 10 2 To resolve such tensions, Cahn encourages feminist
lawyers "to be critically aware of [their] motivations" and to better
understand their actions when they seize "others' images" to ensure
10 3
legal victory.
Moreover, Cahn urges feminist lawyers to rethink the practice
of feminist representation.10 4 Rethinking requires contextual struggle in the practice of representation, especially within the lawyer/client relationship.' 0 5 This struggle ineluctably confronts the
issue of power. Cahn identifies two distinct types of power: male
patriarchy and lawyer paternalism. 0 6 She suggests that feminist
07
lawyers unavoidably exercise paternalism to combat patriarchy.'
For Cahn, feminist paternalism is a kind of doctrinal "distortion."' l0 8
The limits of doctrine constrain feminist lawyers to shape clients
into reasonable women/victims in order to "win."' 1 9 To curtail
such distorting paternalistic tendencies, Cahn recommends that
feminists assess: "how explicit their perspective is to themselves
96
97

Id. at 1431-32.

98

Id..

Id. at 1436.

99 Id. Cahn recommends changing prevailing community attitudes, though it is unclear how she intends to do so. Id.
100 Id..
101 Id. at 42 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
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Id. at 1432.
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and their clients; how well it accords with existing ethical norms;
and how it affects client narrative." 1 10
In spite of her sensitivity to the motions of sociolegal power,
Cahn's treatment of paternalism as a functional distortion assumes
too much. It declines to explain why paternalism is justifiable when
exerted explicitly and omits meaningful comparison of explicit and
implicit forms of paternalism. Further, Cahn's treatment neglects to
establish why paternalism should be judged by the ethical norms of
the existing adversarial system. In fact, she overlooks powerful criticisms condemning the internal, paternalistic tilt of governing ethical
norms." 1 This omission is perplexing given Cahn's own forceful
critique of the ethical norms dominant in feminist practice.1 12 Additionally, Cahn does not explain why paternalism should be appraised by its effect on client narrative. Even granting the legitimacy
of this appraisal, without a fuller definition of client narrative it is
difficult to gauge the impact of paternalism, much less to assess the
accuracy of that measurement.
Because Cahn hesitates to pursue these matters, her calls for
critical self-awareness, collaboration, and dialogue in feminist representation sound plaintive. 1 3 Empathy is no cure when feminist theory affords its practitioners license to "choose to use their own
experiences to inform the representation process." 114 While this
freedom may allow women's experiences to be heard in the law,
those experiences will be based on the lives and choices of lawyersnot clients. Appeals to feminist lawyers to share information and
power with their clients do not salvage the paternalism implicit in
this rhetorical stance.' 15 Notwithstanding Cahn's contextualized approach, the competing aesthetics of client-centered decisionmaking
and lawyer authority may be incompatible. 1 6 The importance of
Cahn's analysis lies in highlighting this inconsistency at the intersection of doctrine and practice.
110

Id. at 45 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
For recent disputed accounts of paternalism, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 317-57 (1988); Stephen Ellmann, LawyeringforJusticein a Flawed
Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990) (book review); David Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1004 (1990).
112
See Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1991).
113 Cahn, supra note 5, at 1443-44.
114 Id. at 1442-43.
115 Id. at 1444.
116 See, e.g., Robert Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697
(1992); Robert Dinerstein, Client Centered Counseling: Reappraisaland Refinement, 32 ARIZ.
L. REV. 501 (1990); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987);
Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client DeliberationRegardingNonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990).
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II
POSTMODERN STANCES

The works of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, William Felstiner and Austin

Sarat, and Lucie

White

proceed

from a

postmodern distrust of lawyering. Their common insight is the recognition of the power of the lawyer-subject: the power to speak, to
negotiate, and to dominate. Yet, unlike other postmodern theorists
7 they afwho imprison human agency and reject intersubjectivity, 11
firm the possibility, however confined, of human emancipation and
community.

A.

Power and Speech

The postmodern stance of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic
is animated by a focus on the relationship between power and
speech in society." 8 Their thesis is that within the conventions of
First Amendment doctrine, speech alone is ill-equipped to remedy
broadly entrenched, systemic patterns of racism. They argue that
the marketplace ideology of free speech limits the emergence of a
"countervailing message" adequate to challenge racism in a historical context."i 9 On their analysis, "free speech . . .is least helpful
where we need it most."' 20 To illustrate this point, they examine

the demeaning historical depiction of four American minority subgroups of color: Mexicans, Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans. 12 1
Delgado and Stefancic find parallels among the socially constructed "stock characters" and "stigma-pictures" depicting minority subgroups.' 2 2 They question the belief that lawyers can simply
"enlarge [their] sympathies [and reimagine these character portraits] through linguistic means alone."' 23 Labelling this belief the
"empathic fallacy," they challenge the presumption that lawyers
"can . . .think, talk, read, and write [their] way out of bigotry and

narrow-mindedness, out of [their] limitations of experience and perspective."' 12 4 The modernist lawyer indulges this belief, invoking
empathy as a nostrum, hence forgetting the situatedness of his own
perspective.

Although Delgado and Stefancic controvert the empathic presumption, they decline to dismiss it altogether. Instead, they offer a
117
(1989)
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(espousing a structuralist theory of patriarchy).
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7, at 1258.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id. at 1261.
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more limited version of intersubjectivity.' 25 Consistent with his embrace of the empathic fallacy, the modernist lawyer proffers an expansive version of intersubjectivity. This version is instilled by a
romantic humanism ungrounded in context. To clarify their more
rooted contextual version, Delgado and Stefancic summarize the
dominant forms and images of racially repressive speech.' 26 The
outgrowth of repression is disempowerment: "speech of the Indians-as well as that of African-Americans, Mexicans, and Asianshas been mangled, blunted and rendered inarticulate by whites who
27
then became entitled to speak for them."'
For Delgado and Stefancic, stereotyping and its corollary disempowerment deny dominant and subordinate groups "the opportunity to interact with each other on anything like a complex,
nuanced human level."' 2 8 In place of interaction, there is an infliction of power.' 2 9 The modernist lawyer is immersed in discourses
and relations of power. The counter discourse of resistance contests but does not impede the infinite permutations of power: racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. Constructivist theory teaches that
"countervailing speech" will not overcome the assaults of racism.
To claim otherwise, according to Delgado and Stefancic, is to misunderstand "the relation between the subject, or self, and new
narratives." 13 0
Delgado and Stefancic contend that racism is embedded in cultural narratives and, therefore, is concealed from historical view.
The modernist lawyer denies the cultural entrenchment of race.
Without that denial, his own culturally-intertwined legal narratives
dissolve into racially-privileged mystification. Because racism forms
"part of the dominant narrative" that lawyers deploy to construct
13
the social world, "speech [is] an ineffective tool to counter it." 1
Like narrative, speech is confined by the boundaries of dominant
culture: "[w]ithin that general framework, only certain matters are
open for discussion ...."132 The modernist lawyer overlooks these
cultural boundaries, mistaking self-regulated forms of client speech
for full disclosure.
Delgado and Stefancic argue that certain areas of speech are
not only closed to lawyers but are also unrecognizable by them: "we

129
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are our current stock of narratives, and they us."1 3 3 It is our own

living narratives that "shape and determine us, who we are, what we
see, how we select, reject, interpret and order subsequent reality.' 1 34 In this way, racist narratives are self-perpetuating.
Delgado and Stefancic dismiss overblown claims to selfreconstitution. The modernist lawyer is prone to such illusory
claims, deluding himself about the organic character of his sociolegal vision. These claims maintain that self-reconstitution is merely a
matter of reformist education acquired through reading, talking,
and writing.' 3 5 Delgado and Stefancic regard such claims of "reform" as a repetition of the empathic fallacy.' 3 6 The marketplace
ideology pervading First Amendment doctrine fuels their skepticism. Because racism is a persistent and thereby "normal" facet of
that market, they question the likelihood of speech-based correction.' 3 7 Racism itself may be unsusceptible to such correction, for
"racism contains features that render it relatively unamenable to re13 8
dress through words."'
To identify covert and overt acts of racism, Delgado and
Stefancic propose that "sympathizers" learn the "code-words" of
race and "racial signalling."' 1 9 Racism, they stress, "is often a matter of interpretation ....

14 0

For the modernist lawyer, interpreta-

tion is unsullied by racism. Rightly applied, the interpretive cycle
expels the tainted properties of class, gender, and race, gradually
rendering the representation process an unalloyed medium of
communication.
Delgado and Stefancic denounce the interpretive obliteration of
racism: "[s]ociety generalizes the wrong lesson from the past,
namely that racism has virtually disappeared."' 14 1 The modernist
lawyer tolerates this disappearance, approving a discourse in which
racism survives unnamed. By contrast, Delgado and Stefancic point
to the continuing presence of racism in public "pictures, images,
133 Id. See also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power
and NarrativeMeaning, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2225, 2245 (1989) ("[O]ur very ability to construct a world is already constrained by the cultural structures in which we are
enmeshed.").
134 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7, at 1280.
135
For an indictment of these claims, see Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1497 (1990) ("Ihe naive faith
in normative dialogue as a means to accomplish change begins to look like nothing so
much as faith in a 'talking cure.' ").
136
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7, at 1281.
137
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narratives, plots, roles, and stories ... ,"142 These predominantly
"negative" images deform the perceptions of both majority and minority persons.1 43 The internalization of subordinate stories, Delgado and Stefancic warn, "precludes the stigmatized from
participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas."' 14 4 They add:
"even when minorities do speak they have little credibility." 145
Both Dujon Johnson and Arlene Sims, for example, experienced
this debasement of credibility. Even when lawyers encourage public
speech, as in the cases of Johnson and Sims, they harbor doubts
about its effectiveness and veracity. This racial marginalization, Delgado and Stefancic argue, weighs so heavily on the character of the
legal imagination and in the content of legal discourse that "more
speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing" is probably fruitless.' 4 6 The modernist lawyer discounts this probability,
remaining wedded to his reformist discourse.
Delgado and Stefancic's lesson of Racial Realism-the notion
that "things will never get better"14 7 -teaches lawyers to reevaluate
speech, particularly the neutral images conjured by modernist
speech. Additionally, it instructs lawyers to restructure the process
of representation to empower minority clients in interpersonal and
institutional settings. Empowerment enables not only individual
speech acts but collective acts as well. As Delgado and Stefancic
suggest, understanding the dialectic of dominant and subordinate
speech is merely a beginning.
B.

Power and Negotiation

The postmodern stance of William Felstiner and Austin Sarat is
informed by "It]he view that social relations are constructed and
power is exercised through complex processes of negotiation
.. .."148 This view rests on dynamic notions of human agency and
social interaction. Both individual action and social interaction,
they argue, are linked to social structure. The media of action and
exchange that comprise the practices of everyday life produce and
49
reproduce that structure.'
Felstiner and Sarat contend that power-suffused social structures are encoded in the mundane experiences of everyday life. The
act of encoding is mediated by past situational practice. Entrenched
142
143
144
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Id.
Id.
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Id. at 1289.
Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 6, at 1447.
Id. at 1448-49.
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patterns of historical practice constrain the range of reformist
moves available to lawyers and clients. Nevertheless, Felstiner and
Sarat assert "that structure and power are vulnerable to major
changes of practice."' 15 0 That sanguine assertion inspires their central thesis of deep-structure negotiation. This postmodern variant
of structuralism suggests that social phenomena are negotiated
overtly, in a manner fairly recognizable, as well as covertly,
"through the exercise of power and attempts at resistance and
subversion." 151
Felstiner and Sarat's post-structuralist negotiation thesis permits wide latitude in the study of social structure and power, especially in the context of legal representation. To verify their thesis,
they study the enactments of power specific to lawyer/client interactions during the divorce process. They find that such "power is not
possessed at all," but rather circulates throughout the lawyer/client
relationship exhibiting mobility and volatility.' 5 2 The constant circulation of power molds the substance of that relationship within
153
discrete cases and across fields of practice.
Felstiner and Sarat's conception of the negotiated quality of
power challenges more deterministic, conventional views of the nature of the lawyer/client relation in divorce representation. These
views hold to a reductionist, lawyer-based conception in which
power is one-dimensional and uncontested. Departing from this
conception, Felstiner and Sarat establish two different types and associated arenas of lawyer/client power negotiation: negotiations of
"reality" regarding the goals of representation and negotiations of
"responsibility" concerning control over case management. 154
To chart these overlapping forms and forums of negotiation,
Felstiner and Sarat provide a case history taken from a female California lawyer's divorce practice. Here, they treat power not as a
static property of constituent identities or fields, like a "thing" appended to status or a role, but as a shifting relation "continuously
enacted and re-enacted, constituted and re-constituted."' 15 5 Their
investigation of this relation focuses on the "microdynamics" of law56
yer/client encounters during the process of representation.'
Felstiner and Sarat claim that these encounters implicate both
individuals and social worlds. In this sense, the encounters signify
opaque and partial meetings of limited accessibility. At these meet150
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ings, both the lawyer and the client construct and exchange accounts of their respective social worlds. Felstiner and Sarat define
this interaction as a "process of story-telling and interrogation in
which lawyer and client seek to produce for each other a satisfying
rendition of her distinctive world." 157 The process is both evasive
and interdependent, characterized by moments of concealment,
doubt, and suspicion, all of which limit the assimilation of
knowledge. 158
For Felstiner and Sarat, the variable elements of mutual dependency and suspicion displace the conventional taxonomy of lawyer
representation in terms of categories such as autonomy, paternalism, and vanguardism. Contrary to this taxonomy, they conjecture
that "no one may be in charge," either in "defining the objectives,
determining strategy, or devising tactics" of representation. 59
Even when the lawyer/client relation indicates fixed patterns of interaction, the fluidity of power dislocates that configuration, restor160
ing the unstable contest of negotiation.
Felstiner and Sarat's concept of relational power as continuously negotiated in lawyer/client interactions decenters the representation process, rendering modernist commitments untenable.
Under paternalistic and vanguard accounts of modernist representation, relational power is substantially denied. Instead, power is said
to operate unilaterally, flowing unobstrusively from the lawyer to
the client. Under competing autonomy accounts, there is evidence
of negotiated power, but it is restricted and renamed. Its narrow
ambit corresponds to the prevailing weak version of autonomy construed as consent.
Modernist commitments are further challenged by Felstiner
and Sarat's observation that relational "enactments of power are situationally and organizationally circumscribed .. ,"161 The added
variables of culture, context, and institution severely limit lawyers'
ability to reinvent stable, generalizable categories of representation. Without resort to conventional categories of interaction, the
lawyer/client relation drifts among competing social constructions.
Sarat and Felstiner's postmodern vision of the representation
process divests lawyers of epistemological confidence. UnlikeJames
Boyd White's modernist archetype, these lawyers lack the authoritative comfort of relying on professional skill and moral attitude for
vindication. Intent upon "[d]eveloping a mutually satisfying sense
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 1454-55 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1455-56.
Id. at 1456.
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of what reasonably can be expected or achieved" in legal representation, they flounder amid the multiple, shifting constructions of the
postmodern world.162 As Sarat and Felstiner's case study indicates,
the lawyer and client may be unable to negotiate a mutually satisfactory understanding of what is legally and socially possible. Sometimes dissatisfaction arises from client nondisclosure or lawyer
misinterpretation. 163 And sometimes dissatisfaction lies chiefly65with
64 and self-deception.'
the lawyer's practices of manipulation'
Two lessons of Felstiner and Sarat's postmodern power "play"
are the intractability of lawyer self-deception and the ambiguity of
client "exit. '"166 Here, I use self-deception to refer to the lawyer's
penchant for overestimating his power to negotiate the reality and
responsibility of legal representation. 1 6 7 Felstiner and Sarat cite
study, noting
this tendency in summarizing the findings of their6 case
8
its display in the conduct of the divorce lawyer.'
Felstiner and Sarat also mention, without elaboration, that the
client featured in the study eventually "asked that [they] stop observing conferences and not interview her further."' 169 Because they
already have pointed out that the "usual client response" to
profound lawyer dissatisfaction "is exit rather than voice,"' 170 it is
puzzling that Sarat and Felstiner decline to speculate on the reason
behind the client's sudden exit. Perhaps the client enacted a form of
displaced resistance against the few agents subject to her control.
Perhaps exit, in its many rhetorical guises, is the only true power of
clients.171
Sarat and Felstiner's reluctance to explore more broadly the
concept of client exit is dismaying given the strength of their analysis. Indeed, the concept seems well-suited to their discussion of
power and negotiation. Assuming the dynamic of human agency,
exit affords both a form of power and an instrument of negotiation.
It signals resistance and withdrawal. Moreover, it is germane to virtually all aspects of the lawyer/client relation.
Id. at 1460.
Id. at 1461.
164
Id. at 1462-66.
165
Id. at 1495 ("The gap between programmatic objectives and actuality in this case
is obvious.").
Id. at 1464, 1466.
166
Id. at 1494 ("In the end, [the lawyer] Wendy imagines that she produces not only
167
optimal outcomes, she also produces new women.") (emphasis added).
Id. at 1493-95.
168
169 Id. at 1493 n.121.
Id. at 1464.
170
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On the ambiguity of exit, see Martha Mahoney, EXIT- Power and the Idea of Leaving
in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (1992).
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Power and Risk

A third postmodern stance is animated by power and risk. This
is the stance of Lucie White. White constructs her stance from
meta-theories of discourse and interpretation. Integrating the
works of Clifford Geertz and Michel Foucault, she sees words and
images as conceptual "screens" or "filters" through which people
constitute and interrogate the social world.1 72 To White, knowledge is contingent: "[d]epending on the screen one looks throughthe matrix of terms or concepts through which one filters what one
17 3
sees-the same event can take on many different appearances."
Turning to the practice of lawyering, White connects Geertz's
sociology of knowledge to Foucault's archeology of power, producing a meta-theory of knowledge/power that resembles a holograph:
"an evanescent fluid, it takes unpredictable shapes as it flows into
the most subtle spaces in our interpersonal world."' 174 For White,
the value of this new meta-theory is that it provides "situated microdescriptions of lawyering practice."1 75 These micro-descriptions locate the routine deployment of power in the lawyer/client
relationship.
Although White is interested in mapping the movements of
lawyer/client power, her larger purpose is to reconstruct entrenched habits of lawyer speech and consciousness in order to aid
"clients' efforts to empower themselves."' 17 6 White contends that
the meta-theory of knowledge/power affords disempowered people
a politics of resistance, albeit a politics that is "visible only in the
microdynamics of everyday life."' 177 This politics is "neither
vanguard-driven, nor co-opted," but a "self-directed, democratic
politics among subordinated groups .... ,,178 With this political
reconfiguration, "alliance and collaboration between professionals
17 9
and subordinated groups" becomes possible.
White's political enthusiasm is tempered by the realization that
lawyers may overrate the utility of meta-theory. She notes that there
is a danger in overlooking the partiality of knowledge in the haste of
theory-building. That danger risks not only "erasing or obscuring"
the world of others, but also "deluding" ourselves into thinking that
"we have finally seized the power to comprehend the world."' 180
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According to White, this deception is a byproduct of totalizing
theory. It misleads lawyers in their analysis of the systematic domination of legal institutions.1 8 1 Instead of concentrating on the institutional constraints impinging on the circulation of power, lawyers
enamored with meta-theory rely upon crude, mechanistic descriptions of institutional power. White cites this misplaced reliance as a
barrier to the development of a "theoretics and a reconstructive
politics of institutionaldesign."1 82 The absence of a sophisticated institutional politics inhibits the comparison of "specific institutional
forms of power against varying flows of power" as well as the explanation of "why some institutions congeal power more than
83
others."1
White's focus on the complex enmeshing of institutional and
interpersonal forms of domination is essential to gaining an understanding of subordination as a matrix of knowledge/power. Because of its complex compositional materials, the matrix of
subordination will cast varied institutional impressions, linking gender and race in one context, race and class in a second, and gender
184
and disability in a third.
White fears that even with this appreciation, lawyers will succumb to the tendency to perceive "human interactions as strategic
contests."' 185 This reductionist tendency demeans personhood by
construing moments of human intersubjectivity in terms of power,
rather than communion. 18 6 At the same time, White disparages
suppositions of "easy access to empathy."' 18 7 She inveighs against
"privileged agents of empathy" who "sanguinely name the feelings
of less powerful others, without cautioning that to name another's
feelings is also to silence her voice." 18 8 For White, this "imperialist
version of humanism" permits the reenactment of domination under
color of representation. 189 She complains that the act of representation, even when mediated by the filter of empathy, objectifies the
181
182
183
184
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Id. at 10 (quotes are in an original draft, on file with author).
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client. Furthermore, she decries the view that empathy must rest on
sameness, recalling the tendency to " 'essentialize' " the other.19 0

To White, the wages of meta-theory are paid out in the practice
of interpersonal domination. These wages purchase an ephemeral
stability in the otherwise turbulent development of a postmodern
practice of law. White is unwilling to abide by this exhange relation.
But, she is reluctant to deny its inevitability. Instead, she abandons
certainty and risks the reiteration of "imperial violence" for the
chance "to listen when others speak to us, and to be moved."19 1 For
White, the "Other" is neither an object nor a text, but "a human
face." 1 9 2 This is White's postmodern paradox: to represent a less
93
powerful Other with tools of domination.'
CONCLUSION

The modern and postmodern stances outlined here are preliminary sketches. They do not, indeed cannot, capture the richness of
nor exhaust the issues raised in the original works. Nor do these
sketches fully map the contours of the developing contest between
modern and postmodern theories of lawyering. Even now, those
contours are just materializing. For the moment, we must be satisfied with the opportunity not only to watch, but also to participate in
the making of a sociolegal mural. Where we see it from is the
question.
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